Cheryl Wolfe1

Chapter Sections

Introduction

Termination proceedings require the courts to engage in the difficult task of balancing two compelling interests: a parent’s fundamental liberty interest in the care and custody of a child and the state’s obligation to protect the health and safety of children.2 A parent’s fundamental interest in the care and custody of his or her children has been characterized as “more precious than any property right.”3 The goal of the dependency process is to reunite parents and children whenever reunification does not jeopardize the child’s health and welfare.4 However, “[w]hen the rights of basic nurture, physical and mental health, and safety of the child and the legal rights of the parents are in conflict, the rights and safety of the child should prevail.”5 The rights afforded a child include the right to a safe, suitable, and permanent home and a speedy resolution of any proceedings under the dependency statute.6 A permanency plan must be developed for a child no longer than 60 days after a child is removed from the home.7 The planning effort includes reasonable efforts to return the child home.8 Permanency planning continues until the plan is achieved or the dependency is dismissed.9 The permanency plan must identify a primary goal and may include alternative outcomes.10 Permanency plan outcomes include the following: return home, adoption, guardianship, permanent legal custody, long-term relative or foster care, completion of a responsible living skills program, or independent living if the child is at least 16 years old.11

The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) requires a termination petition to be filed after a child has resided in out of home care for 15 of the last 22 months absent the existence of a specific exception, i.e., placement with relatives, not in the child’s best interests, or failure to make reasonable efforts to return home.12 In accordance with ASFA, RCW 13.34.145(3)(b)(vi)(F) requires the court to order the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) to file a termination petition if the requirements set forth above exist.

§1 Termination of Parental Rights/Adoption

Two statutes authorize the involuntary termination of parental rights: RCW 13.34.190 and RCW 26.33.100. RCW 13.34 is the statute typically used to terminate the rights of parents in dependency proceedings when necessary. However, RCW 26.33.100 may be used for dependent children when one parent has relinquished his or her parental rights. The focus of this chapter will be on the statutory and case law requirements of RCW 13.34.

§2 Initiating the Action

A petition to terminate parental rights may be filed by any party to a dependency proceeding.13 The petition must include a verified statement of the facts supporting termination of parental rights; the names and residence of the parents, guardian, or custodian of the child; and a statement alleging whether the child is or maybe an Indian Child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).14 Termination of parental rights is a new action requiring original service of process.15

§3 Burden of Proof

RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190 set forth a two-step process for termination of parental rights, and each step has its own burden of proof.16 Under RCW 13.34.190 there are four different bases for which parental rights may be terminated. The first step of the process for each basis focuses on the alleged unfitness of the parent. Depending on the basis used for termination, unfitness must be established either by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt.17 The second step of the termination process focuses on the best interests of the child and must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.18

The most frequently used statutory basis for involuntary termination of parental rights is set forth in RCW 13.34.180(1). Under this set of criteria, parental rights may be terminated if the petitioner establishes the following by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence:

  1. The child has been found to be a dependent child;
  2. The court has entered a dispositional order pursuant to RCW 13.34.130;
  3. The child has been removed or will, at the time of the hearing, have been removed from the custody of the parent for a period of at least six months pursuant to a finding of dependency;
  4. The services ordered under RCW 13.34.136 have been expressly and understandably offered or provided and all services that are necessary, reasonably available, and capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been expressly and understandably offered or provided;
  5. There is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied so that the child can be returned to his or her parent(s) in the near future; and
  6. Continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.19

The clear, cogent, and convincing burden requires that the evidence is substantial enough to allow the court to conclude that the allegations are highly probable.20 Termination may be ordered prior to the child being removed from the home for six months pursuant to a finding of dependency without a finding that all court ordered and necessary services have been offered as required by RCW 13.34.180(d). This is permitted if the petitioner establishes beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the elements set forth in RCW 13.34.180(1)(a), (b), (e), and (f) (identified as (a), (b), (e), and (f) in the above list); or (2) that the child has been abandoned.21

Under alternative statutory criteria, parental rights may also be terminated if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the whereabouts of the child’s parents are unknown and no person has acknowledged paternity or maternity and requested custody within two months of the child being found.22 In addition, termination may be ordered if it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the parent has been convicted of one of the crimes listed in RCW 13.34.180(3).23

As noted above, the court must always find that an order terminating parental rights is in the child’s best interests regardless of which statutory basis is established for the termination.24 This finding must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.25 However, where the court relies on a finding of best interests to support one of the elements required to be proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, the best interest criteria must be proven by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence as well.26 The factors involved in determining “best interest” depend on the circumstances of each case.27 The court has the discretion to deny termination where it is not in the child’s best interests even though the petitioner has proven the other statutory elements.28

The “best interest of the child” is, however, an insufficient basis to terminate a parent’s fundamental right in his or her children by itself.29 DSHS is required to demonstrate that termination of parental rights is necessary to prevent harm or risk of harm to the child.30

A trial court has broad discretion to terminate parental rights when the requirements of RCW 13.34.180 and .190 have been met and termination is in the child’s best interests.31 The trial court may evaluate the evidence in light of the best interests of the child.32 However, the court is required to make an explicit finding that the parent is currently unfit to parent the child.33

§4 RCW 13.34.180 Elements 1 and 2: Dependency and Disposition

The requirement set forth in RCW 13.34.180(1)(a) that the child has been found to be a dependent child does not require the petitioner to reprove the facts supporting dependency by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. The petitioner is only required to prove that a dependency and disposition order has been entered.34 The “. . . termination proceedings are not a relitigation of the dependency issues, and the accuracy of the facts underlying the original adjudication is not deemed critical.”35 “The [dependency] review process results in repeated, updated findings of dependency.”36 The court must evaluate the claimed parental deficiencies at every hearing through the dependency and at termination.37 Furthermore, the state is required to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the parent in the near future. This is the equivalent of reestablishing that the child id dependent.38 Given that termination decisions are predicated upon present parental unfitness, “at the time of the termination hearing the accuracy of the facts underlying the original dependency adjudication is not critical, and the risk of error in finding the underlying facts at the termination hearing is not of central importance.”39

Common methods of establishing this element include certified copies of court orders or submission of the orders pursuant to ER 904. The time to contest a finding of dependency and the supporting facts is on an appeal of the dependency order.40 CR 12 provides that defenses related to lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficient process or service are waived if not timely made.41 This rule is strictly applied to dependency and termination proceedings due to the importance of a speedy resolution of these proceedings.42 A party has an obligation to advise the court of alleged errors as soon as possible so that lengthy delays in the resolution of proceedings do not occur.43

A dependency order signed by a judge pro tempore is void absent the consent of the parties. 44This includes a dependency order obtained pursuant to a default since the defaulted party was not present to consent to entry of the order by a judge pro tempore.45 Although not the preferred method for establishing the requirement for a dependency order, a finding of dependency at the termination trial may satisfy the requirement for entry of a dependency order under RCW 13.34.180(1)(a).46

§5 RCW 13.34.180 Element 3: Removal

The requirement set forth in RCW 13.34.180(1)(c) that the child has been removed from the custody of the parent for at least six months at the time of the hearing does not require an uninterrupted period of removal.47 Rather, the statute has been interpreted to require removal for a total of six months.48 It is also important to note that the statute requires removal for six months “at the time of the hearing,” not at the time the petition is filed.49

§6 RCW 13.34.180 Element 4: Services Offered or Provided

All court ordered and necessary services that are reasonably available and capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future must be expressly and understandably offered or provided to the parents.50 DSHS is not required to offer services to a parent if the court has ordered that a termination petition be filed pursuant to RCW 13.34.132 following a finding that reasonable efforts to reunify the family are not required.51

§6a What Services May the Court Consider?

In determining whether all necessary services have been offered, the court may consider any services offered prior to the termination proceedings, including predependency services.52 The court may consider services received, from whatever source, that are relevant to the potential correction of parental deficiencies.53

§6b What Services Must Be Offered?

The state is obligated to provide necessary services for any identified condition or parenting deficiency which prevents a parent from caring for the child.54 Giving the parent a referral list of agencies which provide the services may be sufficient.55. However, this is a minimal obligation that may not suffice in all instances.56 While the court can consider services offered from any source, the state cannot rely on the efforts of others, if its own efforts may have been successful where others were not.57 However, even where the state inexcusably fails to offer a service to a willing parent, termination is appropriate if the service would not have remedied the parent’s deficiencies in the foreseeable future.58 The unavailability of a single offered service does not preclude a finding that all necessary services have been offered or provided.59 Only services which can correct a parent’s deficiencies within the foreseeable future are required to be offered.60 Speculation that a service may be helpful does not prevent a finding that all necessary services have been provided.61

If a parent is unable or fails to take advantage of services offered, the state is excused from offering additional, beneficial services to that parent.62 However, DSHS cannot ignore a parent’s request for a service that the parent has refused in the past.63 The fact that a parent is hostile, difficult to work with, or resistant to services does not excuse DSHS from offering services when the parent demonstrates a desire to be reunified with his or her child.64

DSHS must offer services to address specifically identified parenting deficiencies. Services cannot be ordered to determine whether a parental deficiency might exist. In In re S.G., a father was ordered to complete drug and alcohol treatment despite the absence of a factual basis for the father having a drug or alcohol problem. At termination, the state argued that the service was necessary to determine if the father had a chemical dependency problem. The court rejected the state’s position and reversed the termination:

“A parent cannot be denied his right to parent his child on the off-chance that he may have a problem unknown to the state.”65 In other words, the court cannot determine whether necessary services have been offered if there is no identified deficiency.66

Visitation is not a service that must be provided under RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).67 The appropriate forum to challenge a dependency order limiting visitation is through an appeal of that order. The termination proceeding is limited to analyzing whether the elements required for termination are met. A party to a termination proceeding may only argue improper denial of visitation in the dependency proceeding if it relates to one or more of the elements required for termination.68 Placement with relatives is also not a service required by RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).69

§6c What Constitutes the “Foreseeable” Future?

The period of time which constitutes the “foreseeable future” depends in part on the age of the child.70 What may seem like a short time to an adult may be a long time from a child’s perspective.71 For example, a time-frame of six months to a year was held to be the “foreseeable future” for three siblings ranging in age from two to eight years old at the time of the termination hearing.72

§6d The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires the state to make reasonable accommodations to allow a disabled person to receive services or to participate in programs.73 The requirements of the ADA are met where the state modifies a service to accommodate a parent’s specific disability.74 This includes instances when services are modified by individual providers to accommodate a parent’s special needs.75 The requirement to offer necessary services may require DSHS to refer a disabled parent to the Division of Developmental Disabilities for services.76

§7 RCW 13.34.180 Element 5: Little Likelihood that Conditions will be Remedied

The fifth element required by RCW 13.34.180(1) is that there is little likelihood that conditions will be remedied such that the child can be returned to the parent in the near future. A parent’s failure to substantially improve parental deficiencies within 12 months following entry of the dispositional order gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that this element exists. The petitioner must make a   showing that all necessary services reasonably capable of correcting the parental deficiencies within the foreseeable future have been clearly offered or provided before the presumption arises.77

The court may consider the following nonexclusive factors in determining whether the conditions will be remedied:

  • Use of intoxicating or controlled substances so as to render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the child for extended periods of time or for periods of time that present a risk of imminent harm to the child, and a documented unwillingness on the part of the parent to receive and complete treatment or documented multiple failed treatment attempts; or
  • Psychological incapacity or mental deficiency of the parent that is so severe and chronic as to render the parent incapable of providing proper care for the child for extended periods of time or for periods of time that present a risk of imminent harm to the child, and documented unwillingness on the part of the parent to receive and complete treatment or documentation that there is no treatment that can render the parent capable of providing proper care for the child in the near future.78

The court may consider current, past, or the likelihood of future drug use in considering whether this factor applies.79 The court is not limited to the conditions set forth in the original dependency in making this finding.80 The statute contemplates that circumstances will evolve during the dependency.81 The dependency court must evaluate a parent’s deficiencies throughout the proceedings. Without identified deficiencies, it cannot be determined whether they will likely be remedied.82 The statute requires a finding that the deficiencies will not be remedied in the “near future.” The “foreseeable future” or “near future” must be viewed from the child’s point of view.83What may not seem like a long time for an adult may seem like forever for a young child.84 Common factors considered by the court in determining whether there is a likelihood of change in the near future include parental motivation, lack of insight, parenting history, criminal history, mental disorder, the child’s needs, parental progress, and cultural issues. Each factor is discussed below in sections §22.7a–h.

§7a Parental Motivation

Good motives and being highly motivated to resume parental responsibility are not a determinative factor in assessing whether parental rights should be terminated.85 Courts are always reluctant to deprive parents of rights with respect to their children, and it is particularly sad when the parent cares for the child and desires to be a good parent. . . .However, it is the court’s duty to see that those

rights yield, when to accord them dominance would be to ignore the needs of the child.86 While the court may have sympathy for a parent based on his or her background or earnest desire to parent, “placement of children is not a bonus for good intentions, nor are children removed as punishment….”87 Rather, the court must do what is in the best interests of the child.88

§7b Lack of Insight

A parent’s lack of insight into or awareness of his or her own problems is a relevant consideration in determining whether the parent’s problems are likely to reoccur and whether there is a likelihood that parental deficiencies will be remedied in the near future.89

§7c Parenting History

Additionally, the court may consider the entire parenting history.90 This may include services that were offered prior to the dependency or in prior dependencies of other children.91

§7d Criminal History

Criminal history is also a relevant consideration by the court. Although imprisonment alone does not necessarily justify termination of parental rights, a parent’s inability to perform his or her parental obligations because of incarceration; the nature of the crime committed; and the identity of the person against whom the crime was committed are relevant to the issue of parental fitness and the child’s welfare.92 The relevance of criminal history must be analyzed in light of a child’s age, the remoteness of the criminal history, and the offender’s recent behavior with the child. For example, a ten-year-old conviction for assault on an infant is an insufficient basis for a dependency finding where the offender had lived with the then-seven-year-old child for several years without incident.93

§7e Mental Disorder

In analyzing whether there is a likelihood of reunification in the near future, the specific diagnosis of a parent’s mental disorder is not important.94 Rather, the issue is the parent’s behavior and how it affects his or her ability to care for the child in the near future.95 The mere fact that a parent has a mental illness does not render the parent incapable of caring for the child—the court must examine the relationship between the mental condition and the parenting ability in determining current parental unfitness.96 “A child should not be left in the care of a parent whose mental health issues render the parent unable to understand or meet the needs of the child.”97 Conflicting expert testimony about a parent’s ability to remedy parenting deficiencies in the near future does not prohibit a finding by the court by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that there is little likelihood for change in the near future.98

§7f Child’s Needs

The ability of a parent to meet the special needs of the child is also a significant factor to be considered by the court. A parent must be offered the necessary training to be able to meet the child’s needs.99 Where a parent avails himself or herself of offered services and works to make changes, but continues to be unable to meet the special needs of the child, the requirements of RCW 13.34.180(1)(e) are met.100

§7g Parental Progress

The issue of parental progress is critical to the likelihood for change element. The court must determine whether the parent is capable of caring for the child (not simply having the child returned to his or her care) in the near future.101 The theoretical possibility that a parent will improve is not sufficient to overcome a child’s needs for permanency.102 That is, what is perhaps eventually possible for the parent must yield to the child’s present need for stability and permanence.103

However, when a parent has shown progress, even if progress was made only after the filing of the termination petition, the state “may not rely solely on past performance to prove that it is highly probable that there is little likelihood that the parent will be reunited with her children in the near future.”104 Conflicting expert testimony regarding the likelihood of a parent’s deficiencies does not preclude a finding that there is substantial evidence to support a finding of little likelihood for change.105

§7h Cultural Issues

Regardless of what culture a family is from, termination proceedings are focused on the best interests of the child. While some cultures may tolerate certain behavior (such as domestic violence) to a greater degree than others, the measure is what behavior is acceptable in the State of Washington.106

§8 RCW 13.34.180 Element 6: Permanent and Stable Home

The sixth element required under RCW 13.34.180(1) is a finding that “continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.”107 The main focus of this element is “whether [the parent-child relationship] impedes the child’s prospects for integration, not what constitutes a stable and permanent home.”108

The petitioner does not have to establish that a stable and permanent home is available at the time of the termination.109 If continuing the parent-child relationship is harmful to the child, the court may terminate parental rights regardless of the child’s prospects for adoption.110 Even if the court determines that contact between the child and parent would be beneficial to the child, the court may still terminate parental rights if continuance of the parent-child relationship would preclude adoption.111 A finding as to this element “necessarily follows” from an adequate showing that there is little likelihood a parent will correct parental deficiencies in the near future.112 Where the proof establishes that the child cannot be returned to the parent in the near future, this element has been proven.113

§9 Best Interests of the Child

Once the court finds a statutory basis for termination has been met, the court must also determine that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests.114 This finding must be made by a preponderance of the evidence.115 If the court finds that termination is in the best interests of the child, but the petitioner has not met the other legal requirements for termination, the court may not grant the petition.116

The court has the discretion to consider all relevant factors in considering the best interests element.117 This may include the child’s adjustment to his or her foster home and relationship with the foster parents upon a showing that there is the potential for devastating psychological damage to the child upon repeated custodial moves.118

§10 Constitutional Issues

§10a Statutory Scheme

The Washington and United States Constitutions guarantee that no person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Parents have a fundamental liberty interest and privacy interest in the care and custody of their children. The state may only interfere with this fundamental right when the state can show that it has a compelling interest, and such interference is narrowly drawn to meet the compelling state interest involved. “In a termination proceeding, the state has a compelling interest to prevent harm to children and has an obligation to intervene and protect a child from harm or risk of harm.”119 “[T]he State necessarily demonstrates that termination of parental rights is required to prevent harm or risk of harm to the child when it shows that all six factors [of the statute] are satisfied.”120 “Accordingly, the termination statutes are narrowly drawn to achieve the State’s compelling interest in protecting children from harm and thus, constitutional.”121

§10b Guardianship and Open Adoption as Alternatives

The court is not required to consider dependency guardianship as a viable alternative to termination if no guardianship petition has been filed.122 However, where there are competing guardianship and termination petitions filed, the court must consider which option best serves the child.123 Nor is the court is required to consider an open adoption as an alternative to termination.124

§10c Effective Assistance of Counsel

Parents have a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.125 An attorney’s failure to object to the admission of reports by experts who are not present to testify may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.126 Depending on the basis for the request, a court’s decision to refuse a request for a continuance may deny a parent the right to effective assistance of counsel.127

§11 Procedural Issues

§11a Termination by Default

An attorney’s appearance at a hearing constitutes an appearance by the party the attorney represents, pursuant to CR 55(a) (1).128 An appearing party cannot be defaulted until notice has been provided on a motion for default.129

Even when a termination petition is resolved by default, the court is required to make findings of fact in determining if parental rights should be terminated. The findings must be sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review. This requires more than the testimony of a social worker parroting the language of the statutory requirements set forth in RCW 13.34.180 and RCW 13.34.190.130 However, “[f]indings which closely follow and which may to a certain extent parrot the requirements of RCW 13.34.180 are not rendered invalid if they are sufficiently specific to permit meaningful review.”131

§11b Attendance by Incarcerated Parent

Due process does not guarantee an incarcerated parent the right to attend the hearing. However, the parent does have the right to defend against the action through counsel and to present evidence.132

§11c Continuance Following Trial

The court has the authority to continue the termination proceedings following the trial pending implementation of court ordered requirements. For example, in In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001), the trial court found that the elements for termination had been met and that termination was in the child’s best interest. However, the court wanted to delay entry of a termination order to determine if a dependency guardianship could be established. DSHS unsuccessfully attempted to establish a guardianship over the next 12 months. As a result, the state requested termination of the mother’s parental rights indicating that the mother’s inability to care for the child had been reviewed and affirmed by the dependency court during review hearings. Counsel for the mother objected, asserting that the mother’s rights should not be terminated without a resumption of the trial.

The mother did not attend the hearing, but her attorney presented argument. The court denied the mother’s request for a trial and entered an order terminating her parental rights. On appeal the trial court’s decision was affirmed. The reviewing court noted that while an additional evidentiary hearing would have been preferable, its absence was not a violation of the mother’s right to due process:133

[The mother] advocates for a bright line rule to the effect that delay automatically requires resumption of trial when entry of a final termination order is postponed. We reject such a rule. Whether a further hearing is required depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If circumstances indicate any reasonable possibility that in the interim, parental deficiencies have been corrected so that reunification is possible in the near future, the court should reopen the proceedings. This fully comports with due process. . . . Here, there were no circumstances indicating any such possibility; rather all indications were to the contrary. Due process therefore did not require reopening the evidentiary proceedings.134

In In re Shantay C.J., 121 Wn. App. 926, 91 P.3d 909 (2004), the trial court at the conclusion of the termination trial found that the state had established the first three elements of RCW 13.34.180(1), but the court continued the case for several months to give the parents one last chance to engage in services and make progress. The continuance was contingent on the parents complying with several conditions related to participation in services.

When alleged problems with compliance arose, the state filed a motion to strike the continuance. The parents requested the opportunity to present testimony at the hearing. The court denied their request and entered an order terminating the parents’ rights.

On appeal it was determined that the procedures used by the trial court deprived the parents of their right to due process because it was unclear from the record if the termination order was entered because the state had met its burden under RCW 13.34.180 or because the state had demonstrated that the court had failed to meet the court’s conditions for the continuance. The court of appeals ruled that the trial court was required to take additional evidence and enter findings before entering an order of termination.135

§11d Appointment of Counsel

Parents in dependency and termination proceedings have a right to be represented by counsel and if indigent to have counsel appointed.136 “The parents’ appearance triggers the court’s duty to provide counsel; no request for appointment of counsel is required.”137 A waiver of the statutory right to counsel must be made on the record when a parent appears for a dependency or termination proceeding.138

A parent’s right to counsel may be waived by (1) voluntary relinquishment of the right; (2) waiver by conduct; or (3) forfeiture through extremely dilatory conduct.139 “Relinquishment is “usually indicated by an affirmative, verbal request.””140 Relinquishment requires the court to ensure that the parent is aware of the risks of self-representation.141 Where a parent engages in conduct that may be interpreted as a dilatory tactic or an attempt to hinder the proceedings, the court has an obligation to warn the parent about the consequences of his or her conduct.142 The record should be clear as to the specific acts that resulted in the waiver of counsel.143 For more concerning waiver of the right to counsel, please refer to Chapter 6, section § 6.8.

§11e Withdrawal of Counsel

Civil Rule 71(b) requires the court to enter an order permitting appointed counsel to withdraw. The client must be given notice of the motion to withdraw.144 For more concerning withdrawal of counsel, please refer to Chapter 6. When the court permits counsel to withdraw prior to a termination trial and the parent does not appear at the hearing, the state may proceed with the hearing. The state must follow the procedural requirements and establish a factual basis for the requisite elements of the termination statue.145

§11f Appointment of Guardian ad Litem for the Child

RCW 13.34.100 requires the court to appoint a guardian ad litem for a child in proceedings under RCW 13.34 unless the court finds good cause why a guardian ad litem is not necessary. The requirement for appointment of a guardian ad litem is met if a child is represented by independent counsel in the proceedings.146 Upon the motion of a party or on the court’s own motion, the court shall appoint an attorney for a child who has no guardian ad litem. Where the child has a guardian ad litem the court is not required to appoint an attorney.147 The court’s failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for the child is not jurisdictional. However, it may render the judgment voidable at the option of the child if he/she contends his or her interests were not protected due to the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem.148 However, where the parties draw the trial court’s attention to the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem and there is no good cause finding permitting the absence of a guardian ad litem, there may be reversible error.149

§11g Termination of One Parent’s Rights

One parent’s rights can be terminated without affecting the rights of the other.150

§11h Effect of Denying Termination Petition

The state is not entitled to appeal the denial of a termination petition as a matter of right.151 The state may request appeal through a motion for discretionary review.152 If the court denies the petition, the dependency remains in effect and DSHS may file another termination petition.153

§11i Sibling Contact (RCW 13.34.200(3)

RCW 13.34.200(3) requires the court to include a statement in the termination order addressing the status of a child’s relationship with siblings and the nature of any sibling’s placement or contact. The provisions of RCW 13.34.130(3) which permit the court in a dependency proceeding to consider whether it is in the child’s best interests to be placed with or have contact with siblings do not apply in termination proceedings.154

§11j Termination by Stipulation

The court is authorized to accept a parent’s stipulation to termination of parental rights provided the stipulation was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.155   In affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court in J.M.R. relied on an extensive inquiry by the trial court at the time the stipulation was entered and an explicit finding by the court that the parent’s stipulation was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

§12 Voluntary Adoption Plan (RCW 13.34.125)

RCW 13.34.125 permits a parent to make a voluntary adoption plan provided the parent agrees to termination of his or her parental rights. The purpose of RCW 13.34.125 is to promote early resolution of dependency cases in which termination appears likely.156 More than a parent’s passing reference to relinquishment is required to trigger the provisions in RCW 13.34.125.157

DSHS is required to follow the parent’s plan if the court determines that the proposed adoption is in the child’s best interests and the prospective adoptive parents are qualified to adopt under the standards in RCW 13.34 and RCW 26.33. If DSHS has filed a termination petition the parent’s preferences regarding the proposed adoptive placement must be given consideration but are not mandatory.158 The court has broad discretion to receive and evaluate all relevant evidence in determining what is in the child’s best interests.159 A nonexclusive list of factors to be considered includes the following:

[T]he psychological and emotional bonds between the dependent child and its biological parents, its siblings, and its foster family; the potential harm the child may suffer if severed from contact with these persons as a result of a placement decision; the nature of the child’s attachment to the person or persons constituting the proposed placement; and the effect of an abrupt and substantial change in the child’s environment.160

An important objective is to change custody only when necessary to benefit the child.161 While voluntary relinquishment of parental rights resolves dependency proceedings faster than involuntary termination proceedings, RCW 13.34.125 was not intended to result in an automatic approval of a voluntary adoption plan offer by a parent.162 The focus of the statute is clearly on the best interests of the child.163

§13 Nonparental Custody

A nonparental custody decree (i.e., permanent legal custody) constitutes a permanent plan for a dependent child.164 Nonparental custody actions are typically an option when a relative or nonlicensed, but suitable person wishes to provide a permanent home for a dependent child. Unlike adoption, dependency guardianship, or long term foster care, the Division of Children and Family Services does not provide any monetary support to the custodian. However, the custodian may be eligible for benefits through programs provided by other divisions of DSHS. The dependency action is dismissed upon entry of a non-parental custody order and DSHS does not provide any oversight of the placement. A nonparental custody action is initiated by a person other than a parent who alleges either that the child is not in the physical custody of one of his or her parents or that neither parent is a suitable custodian.165 The determination of custody is based on the best interests of the child.166 A nonparental custody order must make provisions for child custody, visitation and child support, allocation of federal tax exemptions, any necessary continuing restraining orders, domestic violence protection orders, or anti-harassment protection orders.167 Reasonable visitation rights must be granted to the parents unless a statutory limitation exists.168

Nonparental custody decrees are meant to be a permanent placement for a dependent child. The placement is not designed to be temporary while the parent continues to work on correcting parental deficiencies. The custodian determines the child’s upbringing including education, health care, and religious training unless the court finds based on a motion by the parent that limitations on the custodian’s authority are necessary to protect the child’s welfare.169

The dependency court may also hear agreed nonparental custody proceedings regarding a dependent child pursuant to the provisions of RCW 13.34.155. “The parents, guardians, or legal custodian of the child must agree, subject to court approval, to establish a permanent custody order” for juvenile court to hear the matter.170 Where warranted by the facts, the juvenile court may grant concurrent jurisdiction to the family court to consider nonparental custody as well as the alternate permanent plan of return home.171 Under these circumstances, the return home portion of the proceeding is conducted pursuant to RCW 13.34 and as such the parent is entitled to counsel.172

Once a non-parental custody order is entered the dependency is dismissed and DSHS no longer continues to supervise the placement.173 The nonparental custody order must also be filed in superior court under a RCW 26.10 action and thereby will survive the dismissal of the dependency proceeding.174 A nonparental custody decree and related orders are modified pursuant to the provisions in RCW 26.09.175 Modification should only occur if there has been a substantial change in circumstances since entry of the decree or order and modification is in the best interests of the child.176

A useful tool in dependency cases is to include a statement in the nonparental custody decree regarding the nature of the parents’ parental deficiencies. This provides assistance to the court in the future hearings should a party request modification of the order. It is not uncommon for nonparental custodians and/or parents to present agreed orders for modification to the court. Since neither DSHS nor the guardian ad litem for the child in the dependency case are parties to the non-parental custody action, there is typically no party to provide information to the court regarding the details of the case. Including a statement regarding parental deficiencies alerts the court to the prior proceedings and permits inquiry into the child and parents’ current status.

§14 Dependency and Title 13.36 Guardianship

In 2010, the legislature modified the statutory scheme for guardianship proceedings which flow from dependency cases. Effective June 20, 2010, guardianship proceedings are initiated pursuant to the requirements of RCW 13.36 and are typically referred to as Title 13.36 guardianships. Dependency guardianships previously established under RCW 13.34 remain in effect, but may be converted to a Title 13.36 guardianship.177 See Chapter 21 for more

Download this chapter: Chapter 22 – Termination of Parental Rights/Adoption

ENDNOTES

  1. Cheryl Wolfe is an Assistant Attorney General and Senior Counsel for the Attorney General’s Office. She has been an Assistant Attorney General for 25 years representing the Department of Social and Health Services in a variety of cases including child welfare proceedings in Juvenile Court. Ms. Wolfe graduated from Gonzaga Law School in 1985 and was admitted to the Washington State Bar in the same year. Ms. Wolfe is currently the Section Chief of the Social and Health Services Section in the Spokane Division.
  2. In re C.B., 134 Wn. App. 942, 143 P.3d 846 (2006).
  3. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–759 (1982).
  4. RCW 13.34.020.
  5. RCW 13.34.020.
  6. RCW 13.34.020.
  7. RCW 13.34.136(1).
  8. RCW 13.34.136(1).
  9. RCW 13.34.136(1).
  10. RCW 13.34.136(2)(a).
  11. RCW 13.34.136(2)(a).
  12. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(e) (2006).
  13. RCW 13.34.180(1).
  14. RCW 13.34.180(1).; RCW 13.34.040.
  15. RCW 13.34.070; RCW 13.34.180(4); RCW 13.50.010(2).
  16. In re A.B., 168 Wn.2d 908, 911, 232 P.3d 1104 (2010).
  17. See In re A.B., 168 Wn.2d at 925; see also RCW 13.34.190.
  18. In re A.B., 168 Wn.2d at 925.
  19. RCW 13.34.190(1)(a). See also RCW 13.34.180.
  20. In re A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. 562, 568, 815 P.2d 277 (1991); In re K.R., 128 Wn.2d 129, 141, 304 P.2d 1132 (1995).
  21. RCW 13.34.190(1)(b).
  22. RCW 13.34.190(1)(c); RCW 13.34.180(3).
  23. RCW 13.34.190(1)(d). The crimes listed are as follows: First degree murder, second degree murder, or homicide by abuse against another child of the parent; first or second degree manslaughter against another child of the parent; attempting, conspiring, or soliciting another to commit murder, homicide by abuse, or manslaughter against another child of the parent; or first or second degree assault against the surviving child or another child of the parent.
  24. RCW 13.34.190(2).
  25. In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149, 166–167, 29 P.3d 1275 (2001).
  26. In re A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. at 571.
  27. In re A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. at 572.
  28. In re A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. at 571.
  29. In re Smith, 137 Wn.2d 1, 969 P.2d (1998).
  30. In re Smith, 137 Wn.2d 1, 969 P.2d (1998).
  31. In re C.L., 131 Wn. App. 274, 277, 126 P.3d 1285 (2006).
  32. In re Siegfried, 42 Wn. App. 21, 27, 708 P.2d 402 (1985).
  33. In re A.B., 168 Wn.2d at 920.
  34. In re K.R. 128 Wn.2d at 141–142.
  35. In re H. S., 94 Wn. App. 511, 523, 973 P.2d 474 (1999).
  36. In re H. S., 94 Wn. App. 511, 523, 973 P.2d 474 (1999).
  37. In re S.G., 140 Wn. App. 461, 166 P.3d 802, 806 (2007).
  38. In re Krause, 47 Wn. App. 734, 743, 737 P.2d 280 (1987).
  39. In re Krause, 47 Wn. App. 734, 743, 737 P.2d 280 (1987).
  40. In re K.R., 128 Wn.2d at n.7; In re T.H., 139 Wn. App. 784, 793, 162 P.3d 1141 (2007).
  41. CR 12(h)(1).
  42. In Re A.W., 53 Wn. App. 22, 26, 765, P.2d 307 (1988).
  43. In Re A.W., 53 Wn. App. 22, 26, 765, P.2d 307 (1988).
  44. In re K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d 568, 257 P.3d 522 (2011).
  45. In re K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d 568, 257 P.3d 522 (2011).
  46. In re K.N.J., 171 Wn.2d 568, 257 P.3d 522 (2011).
  47. In Re C.A., 55 Wn. App. 638, 643–644, 779 P.2d 1155 (1989).
  48. In Re C.A., 55 Wn. App. 638, 644, 779 P.2d 1155 (1989).
  49. RCW 13.34.180(1)(c).
  50. RCW 13.34.180(1)(d).
  51. RCW 13.34.132(4); RCW 13.34.190(c).
  52. In re C.T., 59 Wn. App. 490, 496–97, 798 P. 2d 1170 (1990).
  53. In re D.A., 124 Wn. App. 651–52, 102 P.3d 847 (2004).
  54. In re C.S., 168 Wn.2d 51, 56, 225 P.3d 953 (2010).
  55. In re Hall, 99 Wn.2d 842, 850, 664 P.2d 1245 (1983).
  56. In reality, trial courts typically expect that DSHS will do more than provide a list; however, it does not appear that this issue has been reviewed by an appellate court as of the time this chapter was written.
  57. In re D.A., 124 Wn. App. at 656.
  58. In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 164; In re P.A.D., 58 Wn. App. at 26–27; In re C.L., 131 Wn. App. at 277–278.
  59. In re H.S., 94 Wn. App. at 521–§22.
  60. In re Hall, 99 Wn. 2d at 851.
  61. In re A.W., 53 Wn.App. at 31–32.
  62. In re Ramquist, 52 Wn. App. 854, 861, 765 P.2d 30 (1988).
  63. In re D.A., 124 Wn. App. at 653–654.
  64. In re T.L.G., 126 Wn. App. 181, 202, 108 P.3d 156 (2005).
  65. In re S.G., 140 Wn. App. at 805.
  66. In re S.G., 140 Wn. App. at 805–806, 166 P.3d 802 (2007); In re T.L.G., 126 Wn. App. 181, 203, 108 P.3d 156 (2005).
  67. In re T.H., 139 Wn. App. at 792; In re Siegfried, 42 Wn. App. at 27.
  68. In re T.H., 139 Wn. App. at 792–793.
  69. In re A.A., 105 Wn. App. at 609.
  70. In re Hall, 99 Wn. 2d at 851.
  71. d. See In re A.W., 53 Wn. App. at 32 (one-to-three years was too long for a three-year-old); In re Hall 99 Wn.2d at 851 (eight months was not within the “foreseeable future” for a four-year-old); In re P.A.D., 58 Wn. App. at 24 (six months was too long for a 15 month old); In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 164–165 (one year was too long for a six year old); In re D. A., 124 Wn. App. at 656–657 (one-to-two years was too long for a four year old).
  72. In re C.B., 134 Wn. App. 942 (2006).
  73. In re A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. 222, 229–230, 896 P.2d 1298 (1995).
  74. In re A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. 222, 229–230, 896 P.2d 1298 (1995).
  75. In re A.J.R., 78 Wn. App. 222, 229–230, 896 P.2d 1298 (1995).
  76. In re H.W., 92 Wn. App. 420, 961 P.2d 963 (1998).
  77. RCW 13.34.180(1)(e).
  78. RCW 13.34.180(1)(e)(i)–(ii).
  79. In re J.C., 130 Wn. 2d at 428.
  80. In re H.S., 94 Wn. App. at 523.
  81. In re H.S., 94 Wn. App. at 523.
  82. In re S.G., 140 Wn. App. 461, 805–806, 166 P.3d 802 (2007).
  83. See In re A.W., 53 Wn. App. at 32 (one-to-three years was too long for 3 year old); In re Hall 99 Wn.2d at 851 (eight months was not within the “foreseeable future” for a four-year-old); In re P.A.D., 58 Wn. App. at 24 (six months was too long for a 15 month old); In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 164–165 (one year too long for a six year old).
  84. In re A.W., 53 Wn. App. at 32.
  85. In re A.W., 53 Wn. App. at 32.
  86. In re Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d at 695. See also In re A.W., 53 Wn. App. at 32–33.
  87. In re Young, 24 Wn. App. 372, 397, 600 P.2d 1312 (1979).
  88. In re Young, 24 Wn. App. 372, 397, 600 P.2d 1312 (1979).
  89. In re C.T., 59 Wn. App. at 499; In re H. S., 94 Wn. App. at 528.
  90. In re J.C., 130 Wn.2d at 428; In re Bennett, 24 Wn. App. 398, 402, 600 P.2d 1308 (1979).
  91. In re P.A.D., 58 Wn. App. at 27–28.
  92. In re Sego, 82 Wn.2d at 740; In re Gillespie, 14 Wn. App. at 518.
  93. In re M.S.D., No. 59291-2-I, Court of Appeals, Division I, Feb. 4, 2008.
  94. In re Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d at 694; In re C.T., 59 Wn. App. at 498; In re H. S., 94 Wn. App. at 529.
  95. In re H. S., 94 Wn. App. at 528–29.
  96. In re T.L.G., 126 Wn. App. at 203.
  97. In re H.S., 94 Wn. App. at 528.
  98. In re K.R., 128 Wn.2d at 145; Krause v. Catholic Community Svcs, 47 Wn. App. 734, 747, 737 P.2d 280 (1987); In re Sego, 82 Wn. 2d at 743; In re Hauser, 15 Wn. App. 231, 234–235, 548 P.2d 333 (1976).
  99. In re C.S., 168 Wn.2d 51, 56, 225 P.3d 953 (2010).
  100. In re Siegfried, 42 Wn. App. at 28.
  101. In re D.A., 124 Wn. App. at 656.
  102. In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 163.
  103. In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 166.
  104. In re C.B., 134 Wn. App. 942, 953, 143 P.3d 846 (2006).
  105. In re Krause, 47 Wn. App. at 747.
  106. In re A.A., 105 Wn. App. at 604.
  107. RCW 13.34.180(1)(f).
  108. In re K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 927, 976 P.2d 113 (1999).
  109. In re K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d 918, 927, 976 P.2d 113 (1999); See also In re A.C., 123 Wn. App. 244, 250, 98 P.3d 89 (2004); In re Esgate, 99 Wn.2d 210, 214, 660 P.2d 758 (1983).
  110. In re J.W., 90 Wn. App. 417, 430, 953 P.2d 104 (1998).
  111. In re A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. at 572–573.
  112. In re J.C., 130 Wn.2d at 427; In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 166.
  113. In re D.A., 124 Wn. App. at 651–57.
  114. RCW 13.34.190(2).
  115. In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. at 166–167.
  116. In re Churape, 43 Wn. App. 634, 719 P.2d 127 (1986).
  117. In re A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. at 572; In re J.B.S., 123 Wn.2d 1, 863 P2d 1344 (1983).
  118. In re Tanango, 23 Wn. App. at 130–131; In re A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. at 572.
  119. In re I.J.S., 128 Wn. App. 108,117,114 P.3d 1215 (2005).
  120. In re C.B., 134 Wn. App. 336, 344, 139 P.3d 1119 (2006); In re I.J.S., 128 Wn. App. at 118.
  121. In re T.C.C.B., 138 Wn. App. 791, 798–799, 158 P.3d 1251 (2007).
  122. In re I.J.S., 128 Wn. App. at 119; In re T.C.C.B., 138 Wn. App. at 798, 800.
  123. In re A.C., 123 Wn. App. at 249–250.
  124. In re T.C.C.B., 138 Wn. App. at 800.
  125. In re J.M., 130 Wn. App. 912, 919 – 920, 125 P.3d 245 (2005).
  126. In re G.A.R., 137 Wn. App. 1, 6-9, 150 P3d 643 (2007); In re J.M., 130 Wn. App. 912, 125 P.3d 245 (2005).
  127. In re V.R.R., 134 Wn. App. 573, 90–91, 141 P.3d 85 (2006).
  128. In re C.R.B., 62 Wn. App. 608, 617, 814 P.2d 1197 (1991).
  129. In re C.R.B., 62 Wn. App. 608, 617-618, 814 P.2d 1197 (1991); CR 55(a)(3).
  130. In re C.R.B., 62 Wn. App. at 618–619.
  131. In re K.R., 128 Wn. App. at 143.
  132. In re Darrow, 32 Wn. App. 803, 808–809, 649 P.2d 861 (1982). See also In re J.W., 90 Wn. App. 417, 429, 953 P.2d 104 (1998).
  133. In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149 at 160.
  134. In re T.R., 108 Wn. App. 149.
  135. In re Shantay C.J., 121 Wn. App. 926 at 940.
  136. RCW 13.34.090.
  137. In re G.E., 116 Wn. App. 326, 333, 65 P.3d 1219 (2003).
  138. In re G.E., 116 Wn. App. 326 at 334.
  139. In re G.E., 116 Wn. App. 326.
  140. In re G.E., 116 Wn. App. 326.
  141. In re G.E., 116 Wn. App. 326.
  142. In re G.E., 116 Wn. App. 326 at 336.
  143. In re G.E., 116 Wn. App. 326 at 337–338. See also In re V.R.R., 134 Wn. App. 573, 141 P.3d 85 (2006).
  144. CR 71(b).
  145. In re A.G., 93 Wn. App. 268, 279–280, 968 P.2d 424 (1999).
  146. RCW 13.34.100(1).
  147. JuCR 9.2.
  148. In re A.G., 93 Wn. App. at 280–281; In re O.J., 88 Wn. App. 690, 694–695, 947 P.2d 252 (1997).
  149. In re O.J. at 696.
  150. RCW 13.34.200(1).
  151. In re A.G., 127 Wn. App. 801, 802–803, 112 P.3d 588 (2005).
  152. In re A.G., 127 Wn. App. 801.
  153. In re C.B., 134 Wn. App. at 962; In re A. G., 127 Wn. App. at 802–803.
  154. In re A.G., 155 Wn. App. 578, 596, 229 P.3 935 (2010), remanded on other grounds 169 Wn.2d 1032, 242 P.3d 810 (2010), on remand on other grounds 160 Wn. App. 841, 248 P.3d 611 (2011).
  155. In re J.M.R., 160 Wn. App. 929, 249 P.3d 193 (2011).
  156. In re J.S., 111 Wn. App. 796, 802, 46 P.3d 273 (2002).
  157. In re Z.F.S., 113 Wn. App. 632, 642–643, 51 P.3d 170 (2002).
  158. RCW 13.34.125.
  159. In re J.S., 111 Wn. App. at 804.
  160. In re J.S., 111 Wn. App. at 805.
  161. In re J.S., 111 Wn. App.
  162. In re J.S., 111 Wn. App. at 806.
  163. Id.
  164. RCW 13.34.136(2)(a).
  165. RCW 26.10.030(1).
  166. RCW 26.10.100.
  167. RCW 26.10.040.
  168. RCW 26.10.160.
  169. RCW 26.10.170.
  170. RCW 13.34.155(1).
  171. In re E.H., 158 Wn. App. 757, 768, 243 P.3d 160 (2010).
  172. In re E.H., 158 Wn. App. 757, 768, 243 P.3d 160 (2010).
  173. RCW 13.34.155(1).
  174. RCW 13.34.155(3). See also RCW 13.34.145(8) (related to permanent legal custody proceedings in juvenile court).
  175. RCW 26.10.190.
  176. RCW 26.09.260.
  177. RCW 13.34.237.