Written in 2011 by Kimberly Ambroseand updated in 2014 by Kimberly Ambrose and Alicia LeVezu1

Chapter Sections

Introduction

Regardless of a judicial officer’s position concerning children’s presence and involvement in the court during the dependency process, if children do attend court, certain steps can be taken to ensure that they have a positive experience and the judicial process can proceed effectively. Court is an unfamiliar and often frightening place for children and youth. Many children are concerned that being in court means that they are in trouble. Children and youth who are the subject of dependency proceedings have often been traumatized by a history of abuse, neglect, and instability. The following actions can help minimize the negative effects on children and youth of appearing in court:

  • Appoint an attorney or advocate for the child who can prepare them for court, support them during court proceedings, and explain to them after the hearing what occurred.2
  • Acknowledge a child’s presence at the beginning of the hearing and thank the child for coming.
  • Use plain language that is understandable. Avoid acronyms, abbreviations, and difficult legal terms.
  • Refer to the child by name.
  • Start with the positive. Although there may be difficult issues regarding a youth’s family or behavior which need to be addressed, if the court familiarizes itself with the youth’s circumstances prior to the hearing and begins by acknowledging something positive about the youth, it will increase the likelihood that the youth will stay engaged during the hearing.
  • Allow children or youth to leave the courtroom if the hearing addresses information which might be emotionally harmful.

§1 Child Witnesses3

§1a Competency to Testify

Washington law does not set a presumptive age of testimonial competency. All witnesses, including children, are presumed to be competent to testify.4 Children may be found incompetent if they “appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts, respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.”5 The party challenging the child’s ability to testify bears the burden of establishing that the child witness is incompetent.6 Unless the court is making a finding of witness unavailability for purposes of RCW 9A.4§4.120 (see § §4.2c(iii) below) the court is not under an obligation to make a competency determination absent the request of a party.7 If the issue of competency is raised, a child witness may be found competent by the court to testify if the child

  • understands the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand;
  • has the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he or she is to testify to receive an accurate impression of it;
  • has a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence;
  • has the capacity to express in words his or her memory of the occurrence; and
  • has the capacity to understand simple questions about the occurrence.8

Written findings of competency are encouraged by the Washington Supreme Court but not required.9 The trial court’s determination of a child witness’s competency will not be overturned absent a manifest abuse of discretion.10

§1b Protections for the Child Witness in Dependency Proceedings

There is no statutory provision for protecting children in dependency or termination trials from testifying directly in front of an alleged perpetrator through means such as closed circuit television.11

§1c Child Hearsay Statute

General Requirements
Washington’s child hearsay statute creates an exception to the hearsay rule in dependency and termination trials for a child’s statements describing sexual or physical abuse.12 In order for a child’s hearsay statements to be admissible under RCW 9A.4§4.120, the proponent of the statement must give the adverse party adequate notice of intent to introduce the statement, and the statement must meet the following requirements:

  • It must be made by a child under the age of 10;
  • It must describe an act of sexual or attempted sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, or describe an act of physical abuse of the child by another that results in substantial bodily harm as defined by RCW 9A.0§4.110;
  • It must be found by the court to have “sufficient indicia reliability;” and
  • Either the child testifies at the proceedings, or the child is unavailable as a witness. If the child is unavailable as a witness there must also be corroborative evidence of the act.13
  • Sufficient Indicia of Reliability – the Ryan Factors

To determine whether a child’s statements are sufficiently reliable to be admissible under the child hearsay statute, the court must consider the nine factors set forth in State v. Ryan:

  • Whether the child had an apparent motive to lie;
  • The child’s general character;
  • Whether more than one person heard the statements;
  • The spontaneity of the statements;
  • Whether trustworthiness was suggested by the timing of the statement and the relationship between the child and the witness;
  • Whether the statements contained express assertions of past fact;
  • Whether the child’s lack of knowledge could be established through cross-examination;
  • The remoteness of the possibility of the child’s recollection being faulty; and
  • Whether the surrounding circumstances suggested the child misrepresented the defendant’s involvement.14

Not every factor must be satisfied so long as the factors “substantially” establish the reliability of the child’s out-of-court statements.15

Unavailability of Child Witness

If the child does not testify, the child must be found unavailable in order for the statements to be admissible under the child hearsay statute.16 The statute does not define “unavailable,” but case law establishes that it is defined according to ER 80§4.17 If unavailability is based on the child witness’s lack of competence, a competency hearing is required whether or not it is requested by the parties.18

The parties may not stipulate to a child’s incompetence for purposes of the child hearsay statute.19

Corroboration

If the child is unavailable to testify, the child’s out-of-court statement is only admissible under the child hearsay statute if there is corroborating evidence of the sexual or physical abuse.20 Corroboration is determined by looking at all of the possible corroborating evidence, such as physical or medical evidence, other testimonial evidence, and evidence of the child’s precocious sexual knowledge.21 Indirect evidence may provide corroboration; however, it must “still “support a logical and reasonable inference that the act of abuse described in the hearsay statement occurred.””22

§2 Children as Direct Participants in Their Own Dependency Hearings

§2a Age Considerations

No age is set by statute or court rule for when children should participate in their dependency hearings; however, the legislature has acknowledged that youth 12 and older have an interest in direct participation in their dependency proceedings by providing that they have the right to notice of the filing of a dependency petition, are summoned to appear personally at the dependency fact-finding, and must be notified of their right to request appointment of counsel.23

Other statutory provisions concerning age may be found as well. For example, the legislature sets age 12 as the standard for when children may petition the court to reinstate the parental rights of their previously terminated parents, though flexibility is allowed for younger children.24 Children 14 and older are required by statute to consent to their own adoption.25 Children 16 and older may petition to be emancipated.26

§2b When a Child’s Presence is Required

Children 12 and older who are the subject of a dependency petition must be summoned by the clerk to appear personally “before the court at the time fixed to hear the petition.”27 The court may also “endorse upon the summons an order directing any parent, guardian, or custodian having the custody or control of the child to bring the child to the hearing.”28 Developmentally disabled children are not required to appear unless requested by the court.27

A child is not required to appear for presentation of a stipulated or agreed order of dependency; however, the attorney, guardian ad litem (GAL) or court-appointed special advocate (CASA) for the child, if any, must sign the agreed order.29 Further, children are generally not required by statute to appear or receive notice of shelter care, review, permanency planning, or termination hearings.30

Regardless of the requirements concerning children’s presence, the law does not clearly establish whether children are parties to their own dependency and termination proceedings.31 Additionally, the Washington State Juvenile Court Rules do give all “parties” the right to be present and heard at review and other hearings.32

If a child is a party to his or her dependency proceeding, the child has the right to be present at dependency review hearings, the right to receive notice of termination proceedings, and the right to receive notice of motions to modify or vacate guardianships.33

§2c More General Considerations

While nothing in the dependency statutes or court rules prohibits children and youth from attending their dependency court hearings, there are different opinions about whether children and youth should appear and participate in court. There is a growing movement by policy makers, practitioners and scholars toward encouraging greater direct participation by children and youth in court.34

Some argue that a youth’s presence at their own dependency hearing can be beneficial for judicial decision-making and for the youth who is at the center of the proceedings.35Additionally, the American Bar Association adopted The Model Act Governing Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings which provides that each child subject to dependency proceedings has the right to attend and participate in all hearings related to his or her case36 The National Association of Counsel for Children also supports children being in the court room, at least for the initial hearings.37

However, court can also be confusing, frightening, emotionally damaging, and/or boring for children and youth.38 Another concern about children attending dependency hearings is the possibility that they will have to appear alone if they lack legal counsel. In many jurisdictions in Washington, children and youth do not have an attorney or lay representative such as a GAL or CASA.39 Appearing alone in court without representation can be intimidating for a child and can have other risks, such as self-incrimination.

§2d In-Chambers Interviews of Children

Unlike family custody proceedings under RCW 26, there is no statutory provision for in-chamber interviews of children in dependency and termination proceedings.40

However, case law is clear: if an in-chambers interview of a child is conducted during termination proceedings, excluding parents and parents’ counsel from that interview constitutes error.41 This reasoning is explained in part by the fact that, absent clear statutory authority, judicial interviews of children in dependency proceedings outside the presence of the other parties could raise due process concerns.

In all proceedings under RCW 13.3§§4. parties have the right to introduce evidence, examine witnesses, receive a decision based solely on evidence adduced at the hearing, and to an unbiased fact-finder.42 These due process protections have been held to apply to permanency planning and dependency review hearings.43

§2e Determining the Child’s Position

If dependent children attend their court proceedings, judicial officers can attempt to assess the child’s position or preferences through direct questioning. However, a child’s position should also be reported to the court by the child’s GAL or attorney-GAL.44 If the child is represented by an attorney, the attorney is required by the Rules of Professional Conduct to advocate for that child’s stated position.45

Washington statutes and court rules do not address the issue of judicial questioning of children regarding their position in dependency proceedings. Additionally, there is little research regarding the value of judicial questioning of children in abuse and neglect proceedings. However, several scholars have considered the issue in the context of family custody proceedings.46 In the family custody context, there are varying opinions regarding what the scope of the judicial officer’s inquiry should be and what weight should be given to the child’s preference.47

Download this chapter: Chapter 4: Children and Youth in the Courtroom.pdf

ENDNOTES

  1. Kimberly Ambrose is a lecturer at the University of Washington (UW) School of Law. She has taught and supervised students in the Children and Youth Advocacy Clinic (CAYAC), the Legislative Advocacy Clinic, and the Race and Justice Clinic, and she also teaches Juvenile Justice. Before joining the UW faculty, she spent several years as a public defender representing indigent adults and juveniles in both child welfare and criminal proceedings and as a resource attorney for the Washington Defender Association, providing training, technical assistance, and resources to public defense attorneys around Washington State.  Alicia LeVezu is an Equal Justice Fellow at the University of Washington (UW) School of Law, sponsored by Intellectual Ventures and Perkins Coie LLP.
  2. All children in dependency proceedings have the right to request appointment of legal counsel, regardless of the child’s age. RCW 13.3§4.100(7)(a). The Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) or supervising agency and the guardian ad litem (GAL) are required to notify youth 12 and older of their right to request appointment of legal counsel. RCW 13.3§4.100(7)(c). However, the court can and should take a proactive role to ensure that children appearing before it understand their rights and have their rights adequately protected.
  3. The principles discussed in this section (child witnesses) apply in both the offender and nonoffender settings.
  4. State v. S.J.W., 170 Wn.2d 92,100, 239 P.3d 568, 572 (2010).
  5. RCW 5.60.050(2).
  6. State v. S.J.W. at 101.
  7. State v. C.M.B., 130 Wn. App. 841, 125 P.3d 211 (2005).
  8. State v. Allen, 70 Wn.2d 690, 692, 424 P.2d 1021 (1967).
  9. See In re A.E.P., 135 Wn.2d 208, 223, 956 P.2d 297 (1998).
  10. State v. Woods, 154 Wn.2d 613, 617, 114 P.3d 1174 (2005).
  11. Cf. RCW 9A.4§4.150 (allowing for child testimony through closed circuit television in criminal proceedings).
  12. RCW 9A.4§4.120.
  13. See RCW 9A.4§4.120. Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), bars the use of testimonial out-of-court statements in criminal matters unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine the witness, the ruling does not apply to civil dependency proceedings.
  14. State v. Ryan, 103 Wn.2d 165, 175–76, 691 P.2d 197 (1984).
  15. State v. Woods, 154 Wn.2d 613, 625, 114 P.3d 1174 (2005).
  16. RCW 9A.4§4.120(2).
  17. See State v. Hirschfield, 99 Wn. App. 1, 987 P.2d 99 (1999).
  18. State v. Hopkins, 137 Wn. App. 441, 451, 154 P.3d 250 (2007).
  19. State v. Hopkins, 137 Wn. App. 441, 154 P.3d 250 (2007).
  20. RCW 9A.4§4.120(2)(b).
  21. See State v. Swan, 114 Wn.2d 613, 640–641, 790 P.2d 610 (1990).
  22. In re A.E.P., 135 Wn.2d at 232 (quoting Swan, 114 Wn.2d at 622).
  23. See RCW 13.3§4.070 (notice and summons required); RCW 13.3§4.100 (right to request counsel); JuCR 3.§4.
  24. RCW 13.3§4.215.
  25. RCW 26.33.160(1)(a).
  26. RCW 13.6§4.050.
  27. RCW 13.3§4.070(1).
  28. RCW 13.3§4.070(5).
  29. RCW 13.3§4.110(3)(a).
  30. But see, e.g., E.S.S.B. 6792, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008) (creating a pilot project to notify youth of their right to appear in all dependency hearings in four pilot counties.). A report of the findings of the pilot was released in December 2010. Washington State Center for Court Research, Dependent Youth Interviews Pilot Program (2010), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/wsccr/pubs/DYIReport.pdf.
  31. See RCW 13.3§4.070(1) (requiring summons to be served on children 12 and older and “such other persons as appear to the court to be proper or necessary parties”); RCW 13.3§4.070(8) (using the language “If a party other than the child . . .”); see also Baird, Laura, An Inconsistent Invitation: Am I Invited to Be a Party? How Not Affording Party Status to Youth in Washington Dependency Hearings Can Be a Violation of Due Process, 11 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 714 (2013) (discussing the confusion around a child’s party status in dependencies). Although this lack of clarity is a significant issue, there are definitely strong arguments that youth aged 12 years and older are parties. These arguments are less strong for children under the age of 12. Courts should be aware that if dependent children are made parties, their procedural due process rights are potentially implicated.
  32. See JuCR 3.9; JuCR 3.10.
  33. JuCR 3.9 (parties’ rights in dependency review hearings); RCW 13.3§4.180(1) (parties’ right to notice in termination hearings); RCW 13.3§4.232 (parties’ rights to notice in guardianship proceedings).
  34. See, e.g., Model Act Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings (2011) [hereinafter Model Act], available at
    https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/childrights/docs/aba_model_act_2011.pdf . “Each child who is the subject of an abuse and neglect proceeding has the right to attend and fully participate in all hearings related to his or her case.” Id. at §9(a); Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years After Fordham, 6 Nev. L.J. 592 (2006), available at http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1375&context=nlj. .See also Pa.R.J.C.P 1128 (Pennsylvania statute requiring a child’s presence at all dependency proceedings unless absence is excused with good cause shown.)
  35. See Miriam Aroni Krinsky & Jennifer Rodriguez, Giving a Voice to the Voiceless: Enhancing Youth Participation in Court Proceedings, 6 Nev. L.J. 1302 (2006).
  36. Model Act.
  37. Nat’l Ass’n of Counsel for Children, NACC Recommendations for Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases 8 (2001) available at http://www.naccchildlaw.org/?page=PracticeStandards.
  38. Emily Buss, “You’re My What?” The Problem of Children’s Misperceptions of Their Lawyers’ Roles, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 1699, 1760 (1996).
  39. See RCW 13.3§4.100(1) (allowing the court to find “good cause” for not appointing a GAL). See Chapter 8 for more information concerning CASAs and GALs.
  40. But see E.S.S.B. 6792, 60th Leg., 2008 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008) (creating a pilot project which allows in chambers interviews in four pilot counties in 2008). See supra note 31.
  41. In re McGee, 36 Wn. App. 660, 679 P.2d 933 (1984).
  42. RCW 13.3§4.090.
  43. In re H.W., 123 Wn. App. 237, 98 P.3d 81 (2004) (Court’s refusal to allow mother to call expert witnesses in a permanency planning hearing violated her due process rights); In re R.L., 123 Wn. App. 215, 98 P.3d 75 (2004) (Court’s refusal to allow father to present lay testimony in an emergency dependency review hearing violated father’s due process rights).
  44. RCW 13.3§4.105(1)(b) (it is a duty of the GAL “[t]o meet with, interview, or observe the child, depending on the child’s age and developmental status, and report to the court any views or positions expressed by the child on issues pending before the court.”).
  45. RPC 1.2(2); see also Washington Administrative Office Of The Courts, Meaningful Legal Representation for Children and Youth in Washington’s Child Welfare System 1.1(6) (2010) available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/PublicUpload/Commission%20on%20Children%20in%20Foster%20Care/HB%202735%20Full%20Final%20Report%20with%20Appendices.pdf.
  46. See, e.g., Barbara A. Atwood, The Child’s Voice in Custody Litigation: An Empirical Survey and Suggestions for Reform, 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 629 (2003); Cynthia Starnes, Swords in the Hands of Babes: Rethinking Custody Interviews After Troxel, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 115 (2003).
  47. See e.g. Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, § 2.08(1)(b)(2002) (recommending that a court follow a child’s wishes only if the child has attained a mature age specified under state law and when the child’s wishes are “firm and reasonable”); Nat’l Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Child Custody, Legal and Mental Health Perspectives on Child Custody Law: A Deskbook for Judges 298 (Robert J. Levy ed., 1998) (discouraging judges from directly questioning children on their custody preferences because “not only will this cause an internal agony of conflict for the child, the answer is unlikely to be based on anything the court would consider valid reasons”); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking About Children’s Rights In Judicial Custody and Visitation Decision-Making, 36 Fam. L.Q. 105, 125–6 (2002) (advocating for a child’s right to be heard in custody proceedings in a way that accommodates their special needs).